The Kleinboden Path

The summit base

Prior to the gun transports – and in particular for the accommodation of the summit crew – the necessary infrastructure was set up on the Ortler summit ice. For these measures too, construction timber and firewood, stoves for makeshift heating, food and everything else necessary had to be brought to the summit by the route described.

In addition, a field guard had to be set up on the pre-summit to keep an eye on the Italian measures on the Ortler Pass and the Hochjochgrat. Wire obstacles and infantry trenches were to protect the position of the artillery pieces from enemy attacks.

The Ortler cannons

It is not possible to conclusively prove how many guns were positioned on the summit of the Ortler between the summer of 1916 and the last year of the war. However, there are numerous illustrations of mountain cannons, whose location can be located on or near the summit due to the recognisable surroundings. The front reports also repeatedly provide information on the effect of the Ortler guns – but we cannot rule out the possibility that changes of position were made on the summit and that additional guns were not transported up the mountain for this purpose. The transport of two guns in the summer of 1916 is documented, and their position and operating area are known. Haller at least describes the ‘baptisms of fire’ of the two old cannons (1899) as follows:

‘An Italian machine-gun emplacement was set up on the Thurwieser, which made the Tyrolean teams‘ way to the Kleine Eiskögele sour. The Tyrolean Ortler crew managed to pulverise the Italian machine gun nest on the Thurwieser with a single, truly masterful shot from the Ortler gun they had just dragged up.’

There is also evidence of the transport of two further guns to the Pleisshorn in August 1916 with the ‘Ortler Pass’ theatre of operations. These two mountain guns were of a slightly more modern model.

Then the source situation becomes thinner: with the ‘Race to the King’s Peak’, further artillery action was required. Whether additional cannons were delivered for this purpose or whether existing guns on the summit were moved to a new position cannot be conclusively proven at present.

If there had already been an award for the ‘Press Picture of the Year’ in 1916, this photo of the 7 cm M 1899 mountain gun on the Ortler summit would certainly have made it onto the shortlist. The armoured plate was removed in order to convey to the world that the highest base of the First World War was firmly in Austrian hands. In the direction of the shot: the summit of the Königspitze, on the left the Cevedale. Image: Franz Haller, Archive MUSEUM 14/18, Imboden Collection.

Directions of the Ortler guns to the focal points on the Ortler Pass (from the Pleisshorn), the Thurwiese and Königsspitze (from the Ortler base). Map: Kompass Hiking Map South Tyrol online; Editing: Accola

Effect and myth

In the aftermath of the war, there was frequent and controversial debate as to whether the huge effort to position and supply the guns on the Ortler summit had been worthwhile. In business terms, one would ask for a balance between the investment made and the profit realised. It goes without saying that the final accounts cannot show black figures; the Ortler soldiers were also among the losers of the war in November 1918.

Even if the Ortler guns were already ‘old ladies’ at the time – built in 1899 and not up to the technological standard of their successors in the field army – their availability and especially their reliability was still important.

The possibility of taking Italian bases on the Thurwieser and Königsspitze under fire was decisive for the course of the battle along these peaks and ridges in the summer and autumn of 1917, as can be seen in the next chapter.

However, the psychological effect of the Ortler occupation on their own and enemy troops should not be underestimated. The assertion of the ‘King of the German Alps’, the occupation of the world’s highest base of the First World War, the ability to supply this base permanently over a longer period of time: all this impressed both the military and the civilian population, who were actively informed about the defence will of the Imperial and Royal Army via the newspapers of the time. & k. armed forces‘ will to defend.

In comparison to other, also extremely spectacular sections of the Austrian south-eastern front, we now have a wealth of photographic material from Defence Area I – especially from the ‘Ortler’ front section. The photographs, which were primarily staged for the local press, were generously released and distributed by the ‘war censors’. This supported the myth of (quote) ‘selfless resistance against the Welsh (foreign, Italian) traitors.’

Trafoier ice wall

The events around the summit of the Trafoier ice wall bear witness to another par force performance by both warring parties. As the name of this 3566 metre high peak suggests, it is steep, icy and cold here!

In order to understand the significance of the battles described below, it is necessary to know the course of the front in the midsummer of 1917.

Course of the front in the summer of 1917. Occupied line of Austria-Hungary (blue): Dreisprachenspitze – Stilfserjoch – Monte Scorluzzo – Passo delle Plattigiole – Naglerspitze – Geisterspitze – Hohe Schneid (Ostgpifel) – Payerspitze – Tuckettspitze – Madatschkamm – Schneeglocke – Kleines Eiskögele – Ortler – Königspitze … Italian occupied line (red): Pass Umbrail – Rese di Scorluzzo – Filone del Mot – Monte Cristallo (Hohe Schneid Westgipfel) – Passo dei Camosci – Trafoier Eiswand – Bäckmanngrat – Thurwieserspitze – Ortlerpass – Hochjochgrat – Monte Zebru – Königsspitze (shoulder position). Map: Kompass, hiking map online, edited by Accola.

A painful gap – the stake in the stomach

A closer look at the course of both lines reveals that the ridge line from the Stilfserjoch to the Grosse Schneeglocke was occupied by Austrian troops. The following section from the Trafoier Eiswand via the Bäckmanngrat to the summit of the Thurwieserspitze and up to the Ortler Pass, on the other hand, was held by the Italians, which gave them the decisive advantage of having an insight into all movements along the Stilfserjoch road. Supply columns on the Franzenshöhe, but also individual supply troops in support of the Austrian high positions, could thus be closely observed and the artillery observer stationed there directed the effective fire to combat them very accurately. The soldier’s wisdom, as the great Clausewitz put it, that ‘whoever has the heights also dominates the depths or the valleys’ was applied here in an exemplary manner.

This ‘thorn in the side’ – Lempruch described it as a ‘stake in the stomach’ of the eastern defence system of his rayon – had to be removed.

Support points and field guards in the area of the ‘gap’ in the Austrian defence deployment along the ridge line on the Bäckmanngrat. Austrian positions (blue) from left to right: Tuckettjoch – Madatschkamm – Schneeglocke – Nashorn – Kleines Eiskögele. Italian positions (red) from left to right: Passo dei Camosci – Trafoier Eiswand – Bäckmanngrat with several field guards – Thurwieserspitze – Eiskögele – Ortlerpass. Map: Kompass, hiking map online, edited by Accola.

The Italian field guards along the Bäckmann ridge were to be cleared accordingly. In his illustrated report, Moritz von Lempruch assesses the variants and risks involved in realising this essential project. He assesses all options and ultimately comes to the conclusion that the most costly option is also the most promising. The Italian summit base on the Trafoi ice wall was to be conquered by means of a tunnel to be built through the north face, which was up to 50 degrees steep. Assault troops were to take the summit crew by surprise at night, take over their accommodation and occupy the ice wall summit permanently. Actions to clear the field guard line on the Bäckmanngrat and on the Thurwieserspitze were to take place later from there.

The attack

Lempruch describes the course of the attack in his account as follows:

‘The breakout and the removal of the position were planned for the early hours of 1 September 1917 and were actually carried out. All preparations had been made beforehand: Staged deposition of food supplies in the approximately 1500 metre long tunnel, provision of cable car material for the immediate activation of a supply line to the conquered position after its removal, accumulation of ammunition, etc. had been made in detail.’

The Hochgebirgskompanie 30 before storming the ice wall on the march to Trafoi. Source: Schaumann Archive, Digital: MUSEUM 14/18, Schaumann Collection.

‘When the surprise breakout was successful and the drowsy summit post was silently taken in, and the enemy alarm line was cut off, it turned out that the position crew was housed in a barrack located on a rock step south of the summit position and about 50 metres lower than the latter. Oberleutnant Bayer now decided to abseil down the steep rock face with some of his bold men in order to capture the enemy, who had already been alerted by the inevitable noise and had begun to shoot, possibly in his shelter. The own fire squadron, which was embedded in the rock and ice pinnacles next to the break-out point, supported the action of the bold rope party, which finally came under heavy fire, with well-aimed shots. Some of the enemy had run out of the barracks with their scanty clothing, while others were still inside. There was a fierce melee with hand grenade fights, in which we were ultimately the victors, miraculously without loss.’

‘Two officers – including the artillery observer of the ice wall – and about 30 men were captured, as well as plenty of rations and weapons and an entire company registry with records, instructions, orders, diaries, photographs, maps, etc. that were extremely valuable to us. The enemy had suffered heavy losses due to crashes and rifle and hand grenade fire.
Our new garrison immediately established itself in the enemy lines; the enemy counterattack attempted in the morning hours of 1 September, fuelled by hastily brought reserves, failed with further heavy losses. The interrogation of the prisoners yielded further very valuable material for the defence command; however, despite all efforts, including mine [Lempruch’s], nothing could be brought out of the officers, who behaved with great dignity, which I expressly state here in their honour.’
So much for Lempruch’s account of the high mountain company’s daring action on the Trafoi ice wall.

The Italian reaction

After the successful occupation of the Eiswand summit, preparations were to be made for a further advance along the Bäckmann ridge to the Thurwieserspitze and the Ortler Pass. However, the Italian artillery put a stop to these plans by fiercely firing on the Austrian ice wall position. Four batteries took the summit under constant fire. To make matters worse, the ice tunnel – which had to be used for supplies – often collapsed and could only be used once it had been repaired.

The intensive use of artillery was a sign that the Italians were preparing to recapture the ice wall position. The Austrians had to weigh up whether it was justifiable for the few mountain soldiers, who were often cut off from supplies, to remain on the ridge and whether they should be exposed to an expected counterattack. However, the tactical importance of the ice wall position was decisive for both parties and so the Austrian decision was made to hold the position.

Lempruch describes the subsequent action in his work as follows:

‘On 3 September, on a clear, visible morning, the expected enemy counterattack took place with an unprecedented, ruthless use of manpower on the part of the enemy. There was simply too much at stake for him to justify the measures he had taken in the eyes of objective military criticism.

Heavy concentrated artillery fire had been on the summit position since dawn, so that the brave and much-tried Kaiserjäger lieutenant Kurzbauer, a Viennese, who was in command of the position that day, had every difficulty in keeping unnecessary losses at bay; then the enemy attacked the position in three strong attack columns, unconcerned about their heavy losses.’

The situation on 3 September 1917 morning: advance of the Italian Alpine (red) against the Austrian ice wall position. The arrows do not really convey the alpine challenge under the additional threat of enemy fire. Map: Kompass hiking map of South Tyrol online; edited by Accola

Lempruch continues:
‘One echelon climbed up from the Passo dei Camosci, a second from the Camosci glacier in a north-westerly direction. A third moved along the Bäckmann ridge, i.e. from Thurwieser, towards the west. A total of 450 men may have been involved in this attack, which was opposed by our ice wall summit crew of 15 men. I had all my artillery in this area unleash their maximum fire. The Ortler and Pleisshorn batteries, the guns of the Madatsch position, the cannon on the Nashorn, the two field howitzers on Monte Livrio, a total of eleven guns, united their fire on the small attack area. From the Königspitze, the Ortler and the Kristallspitzen it was possible to observe that the enemy was suffering heavy losses. The Alpini could be seen falling en masse from the Bäckmann and Camosci ridges into the terrible depths on our and the Italian side. The ice wall summit position with its dashing leader, Lieutenant Kurzbauer, who was wounded several times, heroically defended itself against the 30-fold superiority. Their machine-guns made terrible havoc among the advancing enemy. Soon the retreat of the small group of ours was cut off by an enemy bypass movement that blocked the ice tunnel. The enemy penetrated the position and occupied it. Eight of our crew were killed, the rest more or less seriously wounded. Lieutenant Kurzbauer was taken prisoner with the survivors after they had destroyed the machine guns. Although the Eiswand summit position was lost to us, the defence of it, easily comparable to the battle for Thermopylae, is a golden leaf in the laurel wreath of Tyrolean national defence in 1915/18. The bravery and sacrifice of the enemy must also be fully acknowledged. His bloody losses in this action of around 120 men are certainly not too high.’

Recommended reading

Accola, Fuhrer: Stilfserjoch-Umbrail 1914-1918, Documentation, Miltärakademie an der ETH Zürich, Au, 2000.

Lempruch: Otlerkämpfe 1915-1918, Der König der Deutschen Alpen und seine Helden, new edition, Golowitsch (Hsg), Buchdienst Südtirol, 2005.

Marseiler, Bernhart, Haller: Zeit im Eis – Gletscher geben die Geschichte frei – Die Front am Ortler 1915-1918. A splendid illustrated book with photographs by First Lieutenant Franz Haller (1894-1989), mainly of the Ortler gun transports. Introduced by thoughts from his son Franz Haller Jr. The second part of the work deals with the recovery of finds in the front area, which are accumulating due to the intensive melting of the glacier mass. Athesia, 1996.